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Introduction: Law and Political Culture
Scholars in several disciplines-including history, political science, literature, and anthropology-have in recent years developed
the interpretation of political culture as an effective tool for the
study of legal rules and legal meaning. This interdisciplinary work
in the humanities comes at a time when the legal academy has
once again begun to look outside itself in a fresh effort to enrich its
own understanding of legal rules and the role of law in society. The
interest in classical republicanism is one example of the legal academy's desire to be informed from without. The law and literature
movement is another similar endeavor, however much its emphasis
is on technique rather than content.
The interpretation of political culture, however, is somewhat
broader, suggesting that the republican vision may be only one of
many and that the technical insights of law and literature represent but one facet of interpretation. More generally, the interpretive study of political culture attempts to understand how the
interpretation of the legal system must be located within a legal
culture (a culture which may legitimate the actions of the actors
within it and even create icons for the society generally). The legal
culture is in turn located within a political culture that gives meaning to and draws meaning from the legal culture. The articles and
book reviews collected in this special issue of The University of
Chicago Law Review illustrate how individual scholars from various disciplines have applied their interpretive techniques to the interplay of law and political culture.
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The great variety displayed by the pieces published in this issue alone demonstrates that the interpretive study of political culture encompasses differing viewpoints and subjects. The bibliography that follows the articles and book reviews includes references
to works that expand still further the scope of the field. Both the
breadth of the subject matter discussed and the vitality of theoretical debate about interpretation and culture make it difficult to
specify precisely the field's boundaries and constitutive principles.1
Nonetheless, this essay attempts to supply at least a provisional
definition of the interpretation of political culture and to isolate
the two significant problems, those of political legitimacy and political identity, that make this interpretive discipline of direct interest to legal academics.
The interpretation of political culture is usefully identified by
three features. First, the interpretive study of political culture involves an expansion, particularly in comparison to more traditional
modes of study in law and political science, of the materials considered pertinent to understanding the meaning and content of political events. Thus the interpreter of American political culture
will look to more than publicly articulated legal and policy reasons
for a decision and to more than social, economic, and international
circumstances. The interpreter will also bring within the scope of
inquiry dominant images in popular literature and art;2 oft-repeated or otherwise successful metaphors and figurative language;3
symbolically significant intermediary institutions such as churches,
corporations, schools, universities, and families; 4 the accepted pracFor one important disagreement among interpretive scholars about the proper understanding of the problems of ideology, causation, and language, see John Patrick Diggins,
The Lost Soul of American Politics 347-65 (1984) (criticizing schools of thought identified
with Bernard Bailyn, J.G.A. Pocock, and Clifford Geertz).
2 For example, Robert Ferguson's discussion of Oliver Wendell Holmes in this issue
includes an examination of a painting of Holmes prominently displayed at the Harvard Law
School. Robert Ferguson, Holmes and the Judicial Figure, 55 U.Chi.L.Rev. 506 (1988).
Michael Rogin, in several studies of contemporary politics, has analyzed and displayed
the broader political significance of popular films. Michael Paul Rogin, Ronald Reagan, the
Movie and Other Episodes in Political Demonology 1-43, 190-271 (1987). Rogin's book is
reviewed in this issue. See Jeffrey K. Tulis, The Demon at the Center, 55 U.Chi.L.Rev. 548
(1988).
3 Anne Norton explains that metaphors "reveal the informal, nonquantifiable content
of nationality. They provide traits in which nationals can recognize their commonality, symbols and gestures in which they can express it." Anne Norton, Alternative Americas 11
(1986).
4 See, e.g., Sacvan Bercovitch, The American Jeremiad (1978) (examining the rhetoric
of Puritan sermons in order to interpret the American mind more generally). See also
Sacvan Bercovitch, The Puritan Origins of the American Self ix (1975) (proposing to study
the Puritan tradition in order to explicate "our obsessive concern with the meaning of
1
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tices and doctrines accompanying government institutions; stories
of political conflict that come to have significance beyond the particular conflict in question; 5 liminal-that is, "marginal" or "peripheral"-groups in society;6 and heroes and political leaders.7
Second, the interpretive study of political culture involves a
self-conscious reformulation of the scholar's own categories for
description of political events and matters. Interpretive scholars
attend to the problems of political language-including, by implication, the political aspects of their own language-with great sensitivity. They regard political language as at least partly symbolic,
a belief that entails comprehending the content of political symbols while simultaneously understanding how that content is
changed by its use as a symbol.8 More fundamentally, the interpreAmerica").
For one comment on the difficulties these intermediary institutions pose for liberal
politics and liberal political theory, see Lawrence Rosen, Individual, Community, and the
Law- A Review Essay, 55 U.Chi.L.Rev. 571, 577, 583 (1988).
1 For example, see generally Bernard Bailyn, The Ideological Origins of the American
Revolution (1955) (discussing the significance of the English revolution in the United

States).

' Norton borrows the idea of liminality from anthropologist Victor Turner. According
to Norton, the idea of liminality
corresponds roughly to the terms "marginal" and "peripheral," designating an individual or (and more often) a group, whose inclusion in the community is ambiguous. Such
groups are subordinated within, or excluded from, economic, social and political structures. Their antistructural character is revealed in the traits ascribed to them ....
When a group identifies itself, through metaphor, with another group, or individual
whose liminality is recognized, it expresses a subjective perception of an analogous subordination in structure.
Norton, Alternative Americas at 12 (cited in note 3). For Turner's account, see Victor W.
Turner, The Ritual Process: Structure and Anti-Structure 94-96 (1969).
7 Robert Ferguson in this issue comments upon the character of American legalism by
studying the judicial persona of Oliver Wendell Holmes. Ferguson, 55 U.Chi.L.Rev. 506
(cited in note 2). In his book, Law and Letters in American Culture, Ferguson argues that
Thomas Jefferson "exemplifies the original form and direction of the legal mind in
America," and that Daniel Webster "illustrates the changing nature of that mind in the first
half of the nineteenth century." Robert A. Ferguson, Law and Letters in American Culture
205 (1984).
Anne Norton treats John Randolph as significant because he represented certain ideal
types in Southern culture. Similarly, she treats Herman Melville, Abraham Lincoln, and
Walt Whitman as agents of particular themes in post-Civil War thought. Norton, Alternative Americas at 176-199, 277-329 (cited in note 3). J. David Greenstone, in an analysis that
examines the same period as does Norton but reaches different conclusions, takes Lincoln,
Stephen Douglas, and Daniel Webster as exemplary of conflicting interpretive moinents
within American liberalism. J. David Greenstone, Political Culture and American Political
Development: Liberty, Union, and the Liberal Bipolarity, 1 Stud.in Am.Pol.Dev. 1, 28-49
(1986).
' For examples of the commitment to regard political language as inherently symbolic,
see Norton, Alternative Americas at 8-10 (cited in note 3); Greenstone, 1 Stud.in
Am.Pol.Dev. at 1 (cited in note 7).
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tive scholar doubts the existence of any perfect or universal language for comprehending political experience. A culture's forms of
understanding are, by consequence, not conceptual confusions to
be corrected by the interpreter's own theory, but rather alternative
conceptual orderings of the world that may reveal shortcomings or
blind spots in the interpreter's own categories.
One consequence of this second feature of the interpretation
of political culture is to create certain links between that study and
the study of rhetoric. Interpreters of political culture attend to
problems of rhetoric both within their own work and within the
cultures they study. If there exist no perfect or fundamental categories, then a scholar's defense of any particular philosophically or
politically significant set of categories necessarily rests at least in
part on persuasion rather than on pure demonstration.9 Likewise,
the justification of a set of cultural categories within the politics of
a culture rests on rhetoric rather than demonstration. 0
While this rhetorical aspect of interpretation is fundamental
to its practice, neither that aspect nor the self-conscious reformulation of categories creates a difference in kind between interpretation and more conventional modes of academic inquiry, such as
versions of science, theory, and doctrine. Indeed, these features exist at times even in, for example, theoretical physics, a field regarded by many as a paradigmatically mathematical (and so demonstrative rather than persuasive) science. Niels Bohr's
formulation of quantum mechanics effectively and self-consciously
reformulated the category of "particle," once intuitively understandable as something like a tiny, unstructured marble, to make it
one possible, observer-dependent manifestation of a set of quantum states.1" John A. Wheeler's aphoristic claim that after quantum mechanics "[nie elementary phenomenon is a phenomenon
until it is a registered (observed) phenomenon" illustrates neatly
both the rhetorical aspect of physics and the self-conscious refor-

For a warning that the modern understanding of thought as symbolic itself threatens to
distort our comprehension of thinkers who did not regard thought in such a fashion, see
Diggins, The Lost Soul of American Politics at 364-65 (cited in note 1). Diggins calls attention to the Founders' own, non-relativist understanding of "the elasticity of political ideas
and their contextual fluctuations." Id. at 362.
1 This problem and its relation to the modem interest in interpretation are the subject
of Stanley Rosen's recent book, Hermeneutics as Politics (1987).
10 Obviously, the distinction (drawn in the text accompanying this note) between rhetoric in scholarship and rhetoric in culture is highly artificial, for it begs entirely the question
of the relationship between scholarship and the scholar's culture.
1 See Erik Rildinger, gen. ed., 6 Neils Bohr: Collected Works 75-78, 91-92, 236-253

(1985).

1988]

Introduction

mulation of categories within physics.1" More generally, the selfconscious reformulation of categories and the prominence of rhetoric will occur in any field during those periods Thomas Kuhn describes as "extraordinary science," times where paradigm shifts
take place."3 These features thus distinguish the practice of interpretation from other modes of inquiry only by their relative constancy within the practice of interpretation.
Third, the interpretive study of political culture treats thought
as an irreducible component of political activity and political institutions. It is, in other words, not possible simply to reduce thought
to a manifestation of social, economic, or biological factors, or to
describe the political activity of a nation without reference to the
conceptual forms used by its inhabitants. Whether or not this impossibility is the consequence of a real irreducibility of thought, or
whether it is a practical manifestation of the current absence of
any theory adequate to reduce thought to other factors, is not of
essential importance to the project of the interpretive scholar. This
third feature of the interpretive study of political culture undergirds the first two features, for it allows, justifies, and indeed, requires the interpreter's recourse to non-traditional manifestations
of thought and helps to explain the interpreter's commitment to
preserve a culture's ideational categories.
Insofar as the interpretation of political culture is already familiar to legal academics, it is for the most part so through the
work of Clifford Geertz, who wrote the book that gave the practice
its name. 4 Geertz himself has articulated some general and influential definitions of the field. He has called the interpretation of
culture "an elaborate venture in. . . 'thick description,'" the kind
of description which sorts out structures of signification and so is
capable of, for example, identifying a forward arm movement as an
attempt to regain balance or the prelude to a punch or a greeting
or an expression of political solidarity or the closing of a contract
or a parody of the closing of a contract. 5
12John Archibald Wheeler, The Computer and the Universe, 21 Int.J.Theor.Physics
557, 560 (1982). See also John Archibald Wheeler, Beyond the Black Hole, in Harry Woolf,
ed., Some Strangeness in the Proportion: A Centennial Symposium to Celebrate the
Achievements of Albert Einstein 341, 356-359 (1980). Wheeler coauthored with Bohr the
seminal paper on nuclear fission, and went on to become one of America's greatest teachers
of physics.
13 Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions 82-85 (2d ed. 1970).
"+Clifford Geertz, The Interpretation of Cultures (1973).
" Clifford Geertz, Thick Description: Toward an Interpretive Theory of Culture, in id.
at 6. The last four examples all interpret the arm movement as the beginning of, or an
invitation into, a handshake. The example is modeled upon Geertz's own in id. at 5-8.
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This thick description takes as its study "thought," conceived
not as psychological or mystical processes but rather as the shared
social phenomena of understanding: "thought consists of the construction and manipulation of symbol systems which are employed
as models of other systems, physical, organic, social, psychological,
and so forth, in such a way that the structure of these other systems-and, in the favorable case, how they may therefore be expected to behave-is, as we say, 'understood.' "16 Thick description
of these symbol systems depends upon rendering comprehensible
the modes of understanding of those who use and inhabit those
systems, rather than reducing those systems into our own.
The interpretive study of political culture thus may be defined
concisely as an exercise in the "thick description" of political activity that is recognizable by (1) recourse to ideational materials often
ignored by other forms of study, (2) a self-conscious attention to
the reformulation of the scholar's own categories of understanding,
and (3) a commitment to treat thought as an irreducible element
of politics. As this description makes clear, the interpretation of
political culture is a form of the study of public opinion and the
relation between public opinion and politics, albeit a form that locates public opinion in shared conceptual structures and paradigms, rather than in discrete articulations of policy preferences.
Despite the distinctive features of the interpretation of political culture, it remains important to avoid exaggerating the difference between interpretation on the one hand and more conventional forms of empirical and theoretical research on the other.
There is no good reason for interpreters of political culture to exclude familiar empirical data, for example, public opinion polls,
from the corpus of materials they interpret. 17 And even the most
mathematical fields, such as theoretical physics, will at times manifest the self-conscious reformulation of categories characteristic of
interpretive practice. The difference between these modes of inquiry and interpretation is a difference in attitude and in emphasis, not a sharp difference in kind. That difference arises in part
Geertz in turn borrows from Gilbert Ryle, Thinking and Reflecting, and Gilbert Ryle, The
Thinking of Thoughts, both in Gilbert Ryle, 2 Collected Papers 474-83 (1971).
16 Geertz, Ideology as a Cultural System, in Geertz, The Interpretation of Cultures at
214.
" For example, Jeffrey K. Tulis explains the passage of the Hepburn Act, authorizing
the Interstate Commerce Commission to regulate railroads and railroad rates, both by reference to such familiar sources as the Congressional debates and by an exegesis of the importance of national railroads as a political symbol. Jeffrey K. Tulis, The Rhetorical Presidency
97-116 (1987).
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because interpretation of political culture aims not only to describe
where the public stands on some issue but also to specify the dynamic ideational processes that generate particular stands.
Both the name and the principles of the interpretation of political culture may remind some legal thinkers of the recent scholarship on "Law and Literature" and "Law and Literary Criticism."1 8 These apparent similarities mask deep and important
differences. First, and most importantly, the "Law and Literature"
and "Law and Literary Criticism" movements have regarded literary interpretation as important to law for the way it illustrates the
process of legal reasoning,"' while, as the pieces in this issue exemplify, the interpretation of political culture is important to legal
scholarship for the substantive description of American politics
and the American law it produces.2 0 Second, while the "Law and
Literature" and the "Law and Literary Criticism" movements frequently make the dependence of law upon written documents the
basis of their arguments, the interpretation of political culture directs the attention of legal scholars beyond legal documents to culture more generally.
Yet to stress the differences between the interpretation of political culture and the scholarship on "Law and Literature" and
"Law and Literary Criticism" is not to say the fields are entirely
distinct: indeed, the interpretation of political culture may at times
draw on aspects of both movements. A comparison of, on the one
hand, Anne Norton's use of Hamlet to explicate the principles and
paradigms of Southern politics and, on the other, Ronald Dwor18See, e.g., the University of Texas symposium on law and literature, 60 Tex.L.Rev. 373
(1982), and the University of Southern California symposium on law and interpretation, 58

S.Cal.L.Rev. 1 (1985).
19See Ronald Dworkin, Law as Interpretation, 60 Tex.L.Rev. 527 (1982); Owen M. Fiss,
Objectivity and Interpretation, 34 Stan.L.Rev. 739 (1982); Paul Brest, Interpretation and
Interest, 34 Stan.L.Rev. 765 (1982); Sanford Levinson, Law as Literature, 60 Tex.L.Rev. 373
(1982); and Stanley Fish, Working on the Chain Gang: Interpretation in Law and Literature, 60 Tex.L.Rev. 551 (1982), all agreeing that interpretation is important to law for what
it has to say about the nature of legal reasoning, although disagreeing radically about the
implications of interpretive theory for legal theory.
20

Of course, the law and literature movement is sufficiently diverse to encompass cer-

tain projects that have substantive aims comparable to works in law and political culture.
Indeed, some works easily fit aspects of both law and literature as well as law and political
culture, treating legal texts as elements of the larger culture. Notable examples include
James Boyd White's study of the way judicial opinions create a shared language, Richard
Posner's analysis of the rhetoric of judicial opinions, and Robert Ferguson's discussion of

the place of legal oratory in American culture. See James Boyd White, When Words Lose
Their Meaning: Constitutions and Reconstitutions of Language, Character, and Community
(1984); Richard A. Posner, Law and Literature: A Relation Reargued, 72 Va.L.Rev. 1351
(1986); and Ferguson, Law and Letters in American Culture (cited in note 7).
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kin's use of the same play to elucidate the structure of legal reasoning, illustrates at once both the way in which the interpretation
of political culture may draw upon "Law and Literature" and also
the way in which the interpretation of political culture stresses
substantive description. 2 '
The defining features of the interpretation of political culture
manifest themselves in an attention to two 'fundamental constituents of politics, legitimacy and identity. In the act of discovering
buried or neglected facets of legal and political culture, thereby reinterpreting contemporary culture, those Who engage in the inquiry
invigorate our visions of the proper polity. Thus, the interpretation
of the interplay of law and political culture is the study, as well as
the practice, of a form of legitimation.
The political culture sets both the boundaries and the direction of legal argument,2 creating a forum for such discourse but
insisting that the content of the discourse take certain forms. To
the extent that a controversial argument may be embodied in a
legitimate form, the argument itself has begun to achieve a certain
legitimacy. The capacity to manipulate the forms of legal argument, to render palatable otherwise distasteful notions, is at the
heart of legitimation. How far the legal system will go in liberating
or in repressing individual and collective goals depends on its perceived legitimate role within the general political culture. The law
may recognize as legitimate an individual's property in her own labor; the law may regard any collective activity not sanctioned by
the state as illegitimate, hence punishable as a conspiracy. Thus,
the law's power to sanction, quash, or deter individual or collective
action is the power to help determine an act's legitimacy, at least
for that moment.
More particularly, the relationship between law and political
culture in America is curiously symbiotic. While our political culture defines the scope of interpretations considered legally legiti-

" Norton, Alternative Americas at 196-97, 271 (cited in note 3); Ronald Dworkin, Law
as Interpretation, 60 Tex.L.Rev. at 530-531 (cited in note 19).
Works often considered representative of law and literature may also use literature to
illuminate substantive themes in the law or in legal thought. See the exchange between
Robin West, Authority, Autonomy, and Choice: The Role of Consent in the Moral and Political Visions of Franz Kafka and Richard Posner, 99 Harv.L.Rev. 384 (1985), and Posner,
72 Va.L.Rev. 1351 (cited in note 20).
22 Anne Norton, Transubstantiation: The Dialectic of Constitutional Authority, 55
U.Chi.L.Rev. 458 (1988); Morton Horwitz, The Warren Court: Rediscovering the Link Between Law and Culture, 55 U.Chi.L.Rev. 450 (1988); J. David Greenstone, Against Simplicity: The Cultural Dimensions of the Constitution, 55 U.Chi.L.Rev. 428 (1988).
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mate,2 3 the argumentative and interpretive forms the legal system
provides are so elastic that their creative use can powerfully alter
the political landscape.2 4 The examples are numerous and pervade
American history. Marshall's artful evocation in Marbury v.
Madison 5 of the role of a judiciary has helped to give us a political
system in which the courts have developed an institutional autonomy within government. That autonomy has been transformed,
since Marshall, into a putative neutrality within politics. In our
own times, the law's definition of rights and injuries, from property
rights to actions cognizable as torts, helps determine the contours
of debate on any given issue. Indeed, the very existence of a culture of rights indicates how pervasive has been law's influence on
political culture.
Longstanding interpretations of some legal forms, especially
the Constitution and the legal and political traditions it embodies,
have even so pervaded the everyday claims of Americans that they
can contain a political force far beyond their actual legal force.
When an individual asserts the right to free speech, for example,
the assertion is usually not a legal claim against the government. It
is usually nothing more than a claim to be able to speak one's
mind free from the interference of others. This claim, however, is
legitimated not so much by the content of the speech as by the
prohibition on governmental censorship embodied in the first
amendment, which has been transformed into a claim that no one
may authoritatively hush another. The claim is, nonetheless,
phrased in the terms of a right, that is, a claim with legal force. In
that sense a cultural tradition, one with decidedly indistinct historical roots and a controversial philosophical pedigree, has developed, at least in part, because it is constitutionally ensconced.
Law has constituted itself with the claim that it is a relatively
autonomous element of the culture; law claims an independent and
creative power within political culture. It can both constrain and
The classic work on the subject remains Louis Hartz, The Liberal Tradition in
America (1955). For an extended discussion of that book relating Hartz to many of the
themes discussed in this issue, see Greenstone, 1 Stud.in Am.Pol.Dev. 1 (cited in note 7).
"4For example, Robert Ferguson discusses how American legal orators, and Daniel
Webster in particular, reconstituted the legal idea of union in a way that shaped nineteenth
century politics. Ferguson's own study of Webster's practice effects a second remaking of
the concept, conjoining poetic and political meanings of union. Ferguson, Law and Letters
in American Culture at 59-84 (cited in note 7). See also Jack Rakove's treatment of
Madison's understanding of Ellsworth's image of union, Jack Rakove, The Madisonian Moment, 55 U.Chi.L.Rev. 473, 499 (1988).
25 5 U.S. 137 (1803).
"'
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conserve the political culture;26 it may also legitimate controversial
and minority ideas by clothing them in legal garb. It can do so
because law has its own pattern of development and it uses our
language in its own way. Its autonomy, and its legitimacy, stem
from its ability to capture the, essential-and not so essential-elements of the political culture in that pattern and language.
The legal system, in short, domesticates political norms. The legal
system, however, can also bind the culture. A particular interpretation of constitutional norms embodied in a court decision may, for
example, help foreclose the culture in general from considering alternative interpretations. The current debate within the academy
generally, and the law schools in particular, over the meaning of
republicanism within American culture, for example, has reopened
a political vision that had been given up for nearly two centuries,
in part because non-republican legal interpretations became
entrenched.2 7
Only the extremely naive can argue that a contemporary republicanism must be a political and legal vision of our own creation. If it were only such a vision it would hardly have to bother
with the name republican or the visions of what constitutes a republic embodied in the thought of individuals from Plato to
Madison. 28 The content of the thought, and the contexts in which
it was developed, are more than a pedigree legitimating, through
historical authority, political ideals for our consideration. Rather,
the embodiment of republican ideals in our Constitution and lesser
laws requires us to interpret the language used in the documents
containing those legal rules. The interplay between the documents
and the interpreter helps constitute the identity of the interpreter
and the community to which the interpreter belongs. Historians
are undoubtedly correct in stressing the contextual limits imposed
on the interpretation of the language in a document at any given
moment. But language's very plasticity-its inability to capture
completely a clear thought, much less an inchoate or aspirational
concept-leaves us free, indeed encourges us and further, ought to
encourage us self-consciously to engage in an interpretation that
captures the aspirations embodied in the language.
Eugene 0. Genovese, Roll, Jordan, Roll 25-49 (1972).
See Horwitz, 55 U.Chi.L.Rev. 450, 454 (cited in note 22).
28 For disparate views on the possibilities for a modern republicanism in American law,
26

27

see Horwitz, 55 U.Chi.L.Rev. 450; John Patrick Diggins, Class, Classical, and Consensus
Views of the Constitution, 55 U.Chi.L.Rev. 555 (1988); Greenstone, 55 U.Chi.L.Rev. 428
(cited in note 22).
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Such an interplay is inevitable because we think in language
systems.2 9 For that reason, while law uses our language, it also
remakes the language, because it embodies at once aspirations and
the limits of the moment. At a later moment, the aspirations may
be differently, more fully, realizable, and the language takes on a
new meaning. The identity of the community captured by the language will have changed, though the words remain the same. In
that sense the interpretation of the culture of republicanism, for
example, can inform our contemporary political culture, can help
us realize our deeper aspirations captured in the legal forms that
constitute our political system.
While the interpretation of law is an everyday process, certain
points in history can crystallize the identity of a community that is
embodied in language. The adoption of the Constitution itself signaled the beginning of the end of the republican vision and gave
America the legal language on which to more fully realize a commercial republic.3 0 But, the Constitution was less clear on other
matters, remaining susceptible to contradictory interpretations
that necessarily awaited resolution at later moments. For nearly
seventy-five years, for example, American constitutional politics
held in tension the competing languages that divided North from
South and structured conflict over decisive political issues. The
Civil War was, in part, fought over which language best held the
identity of the American community. 1 Of course, such tensions
have only once required resolution in war. At other crucial moments, artful interpretation has given us a contingent resolution of
the tensions.
The risk of defining the interplay of political culture and law
in this symbiotic manner, however, is that it sounds tautologous;
that which exists defines that which is legitimate. If the political,
and legal, worlds were self-defining, then such an accusation would
have very powerful force. But identity is not self-defining. It partakes of a reflection, a chase after certain defining ideals combined
with moments when the ideals themselves are scrutinized, reinvigorated, redefined, or discarded.2 The definition of political identity is thus a product of the contingencies of the moment and more
J.G.A. Pocock, Politics, Language and Time 15 (1973).
See generally Gordon S. Wood, The Creation of the American Republic (1969).
31 See generally Anne Norton, Alternative Americas (cited in note 3).
'3 This continuing reflection is of immediate relevance to constitutional interpretation
because of the Constitution's assertion that it is the result of "the People's" authorship. See
generally, Norton, 55 U.Chi.L.Rev. 458 (cited in note 22).
29

30
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persistent elements of the culture.
Moments of political crisis not only test and reform standards
of legitimacy but also may lay bare the character and content of
national identity. A crisis may reveal not only a deep consensus
within political culture but also the existence of fundamental tensions among the aspirations of a culture. The Civil War provides a
paradigmatic example. J. David Greenstone, for example, examines
the thought of Abraham Lincoln, Stephen Douglas, and Daniel
Webster to show how the politics in the American North in the
1850s revealed that American culture contained "fundamental differences of meaning and description, of knowledge, of ethics, and
the human personality" resulting from "fundamentally different
interpretations of unavoidably ambiguous rules." 3
Yet while periodic occasions of political crisis may both serve
to crystallize the national identity at the moment of crisis and also
help to reveal that identity to later interpreters, they do not simply
resolve the questions asked by the interpretive scholar. Indeed, in
one sense they may deepen them: the political resolution to a period of crisis may result in a reformation of identity that hides
what were once crucial aspects of or tensions within an earlier
identity.3 ' Moreover, recognizing a true crisis is itself a difficult
problem for the interpreter of political culture. Legal scholarship
today, for example, sometimes constitutes itself within the mode of
crisis;3 5 does that rhetoric signify a true crisis in either legal
thought or American politics? 6 Finally, even a true crisis will at
best illustrate the character of national identity only with respect
3 Greenstone, 1 Stud.in Am.Pol.Dev. at 21 and following pages (cited in note 7). For
further development of Greenstone's ideas on the relation between constitutional development and constitutive rules, see Greenstone, 55 U.Chi.L.Rev. 428 (cited in note 22).
3,See, e.g., Norton, Alternative Americas at 16 (arguing that Melville, Lincoln, and
Whitman effected a "reformation of national identity in the wake of the war" and that this
new identity "elaborated itself not only in historical accounts of the nation and the war, but
also in the subsequent policies and institutional development of the United States").
"I See, e.g., Richard Davies Parker, The Past of Constitutional Theory-And Its Future, 42 Ohio St.L.J. 223 (1981) (constitutional scholars have reached a "crossroads" where
they must decide whether to continue along established lines or "turn in a new direction");
G. Edward White, The Text, Interpretation, and Critical Standards, 60 Tex.L.Rev. 569
(1982) ("[o]ne is hard pressed to summon up subjects that are more important for American
academic culture at this juncture in its history" than "the nature of scholarly interpretation
and the formation of critical standards for evaluating scholarship"); Sanford Levinson, "The
Constitution" in American Civil Religion, 1979 S.Ct.Rev. 123, 151 (1979) ("The 'death of
constitutionalism' may be the central event of our time just as the 'death of God' was that
of the past century (and for much the same reason)").
'0 On this point, consider Paul de Man's self-referential exegesis of Mallarm6's speech
on a crisis in poetry, in Paul de Man, Criticism and Crisis, in de Man, Blindness and Insight: Essays in the Rhetoric of Contemporary Criticism 3-8 (2d ed. 1983).
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to some limited number of problems at the focus of the crisis.
Even in the context of a possible crisis, and certainly in the
absence of crisis, any representation of national identity-whether
constructed as a matter of practical politics by the inhabitants of a
culture or as a more self-conscious matter of scholarly inquiry by
the student of a culture-will necessarily have to answer two questions about political thought: whose opinions count, and how do
they count? Both questions are of central concern to the interpreter of political culture.
Today's egalitarian impulse to assert that everybody's opinion
counts in American politics obscures the difficulty of the first question. Through most of American history, the exclusion from the
public domain has in fact been remarkably broad, diminishing if
not eliminating entirely the political authority that might otherwise have been accorded to the opinions of blacks, women, children, native Americans, the poor, and others. Even if we dismiss
such exclusions based upon gender, ethnicity, or wealth as
clear-but certainly historically and still presently significant-mistakes, the question of whom to include remains very difficult. Is citizenship an appropriate requirement? And if the the
opinions of resident aliens count, do only the opinions of legally
resident aliens count? Does it matter whether they speak English?
Do corporations, or other collectivities, have opinions of their own?
More perplexing questions arise when we begin to consider
those with extreme or unusual views. The question of who counts
is obviously tied up with the question of how people count: it is
much less troublesome to include anomalous opinions within those
that count if it is possible to "explain away" some of the peculiarities of those opinions. Thus, the white supremacist or the superstitious eccentric might be regarded as true members of the American
community, but some might take their opinions to stand for something different than what they themselves take those opinions to
stand for: extraordinary opinions might be said to be distorted by
prejudice; or by a selfish quest for distinction, status, or celebrity;
or by an impoverished education. On the other hand, it is possible
that these apparently exceptional individuals may be exceptional

" A number of constitutional amendments were necessary to guarantee the franchise to
the groups mentioned in the text. See U.S. Const., amend. XV (blacks and other racial
minorities), XIX (women), XXIV (barring poll taxes), and XXVI (eighteen year-olds). On
the political significance of American Indians for American politics, see Michael Paul Rogin,
Liberal Society and the Indian Question, in Rogin, Ronald Reagan, the Movie at 134 (cited
in note 2).
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only for their candor: their opinions may be especially true indicators of a collective identity that more prudent members of the collectivity conceal. Still a third possibility is that exceptional groups
and opinions have a sort of ambiguously negative significance: the
larger community may define itself in opposition to these exceptional elements.
The problem of deciding how an opinion counts for the purpose of determining national identity is not limited, however, to
the evaluation of the extraordinary members of the community.
On the contrary, it is pervasive. How is one to count the littlethought-about opinions of the mainstream members of the community? One must have some way of distinguishing between what
people now think, and what they would think after reflection and
research, and a way of distinguishing the relative importance of
these reflective and unreflective opinions.
Moreover, while overt manifestations of belief in certain ideals
is the easiest aspect of political culture to discern, belief may be
expressed in other ways. Collective political identity is a product of
the continuing collective judgment of the population about the legitimacy of the political culture, both its elements and its entirety.
That judgment may express itself in acquiescence-tolerating departures from ideals-for reasons deemed necessary to the preservation of other ideals. That acquiescence may embody a false necessity, but it also may embody the actual collective choice of the
polity trying to achieve one ideal in preference to another.
Certain historical moments may also precipitate dramatic
changes in the choice of ideals, and hence in what constitutes acquiescence as well as in articulated beliefs. Political directions, and
legal forms and arguments, may be legitimate at one point in history but anathema at others. What are the forms? How do they
interact? Why do they change? The interpretive study of our legal
system and its political culture attempts to answer these questions.
In seeking to resolve these questions and thereby to produce a
representation of national identity, interpreters of political culture
explicate the shared texts, conceptual and symbolic structures, and
principles that constitute politics within our nation. These forms
effect a metaphoric unification of particular characteristics of individual and group identity with particular principles and particular
allocations of power, and so structure the possibilities of political
discourse. The forms thereby define the ideal boundaries (or a set
of perhaps conflicting ideal boundaries) of the nation, separating
what is essential to the nation from what exists within it as a matter of contingent circumstance.
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So understood, the interpretation of political culture is itself a
distinctly political, although not necessarily partisan, project. As
an intellectual strategy for comprehending legal controversy, it is
inseparable from the nation's striving to articulate its own standards of legitimacy and its own identity. The essays that follow
thus reflect, in self-conscious fashion, the tensions and multivalence of the political culture they study, both in their conclusions
and in their refinement of the interpretive method. By their recognition of cultural complexity and the consequent need for interpretive argument, these essays invite the legal reader to reinterpret
their significance, and the significance of political culture, for law.
Gregory A. Mark and ChristopherL. Eisgruber

